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MEMORY. REPRODUCTION AND ASSOCIATION.
BY ERNST MACH.^
ON a walk through the streets of Innsbruck, I meet a man whose
face, form, walk, and way of speaking stimulates in me the vivid
thought of such a face, walk, and so on in different surroundings
—on the banks of the Lake of Garda. I recognize the man A, who
appears to me as a sense-experience in the present surroundings,
to be the same man who makes a part of my recollection with the
surroundings R. The recognition, the identification, would have no
meaning if A were not given tunce. Presently conversations with
A in R occur to me, I recollect expeditions which I took in his
company, and so on. Similar facts which we observe on the most
varied occasions can be grouped together in a rule: a sense-expe-
rience with the parts A B C D .... brings to remembrance an earlier
sense-experience with the parts A K L M . . .
.
, that is to say, the
latter idea enters, it is reproduced. Now, since the reproduction of
KLM .... by BCD .... does not follow generally, we nat-
urally conclude that KLM .... is introduced by the common part
A and proceeds from it. On the reproduction of A depends that
of K L M .... and the parts KLM .... were given by the senses
simultaneously (in temporal contact) with A either directly or with
other already reproduced terms. All the processes connected here-
with can be reduced to this single law of association.
Association is of great biological importance. Every psycho-
logical adaptation to surroundings, every common and also every
* Translated from Erkenntnis und Irrtum by Philip E. B. Jourdain.
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scientific experience rest on it. If the surroundings of living beings
did not consist of parts which remain at least approximately con-
stant or could be analyzed into periodically recurring events, ex-
perience would be impossible and association valueless. Only if
the environment remains unchanged can the bird connect the visible
part of its surroundings with the notion of the locality of its nest.
Only if the approaching enemy or the flying prey is always an-
nounced by the same noise, can the associated idea cause the reac-
tion of a corresponding readiness for either flight or attack. An
approximate stability makes experience possible, and inversely the
actual possibility of experience allows us to conclude as to the
stability of the surroundings. The result justifies our supposition
of constancy- as based on scientific method.
A newly born child is thrown on its own reflex movements,
like an animal of lower organization. It has the inborn impulse to
suck, to cry if it needs help, and so on. As it grows up it, like the
higher animals, acquires the first primitive experiences by associa-
tion. It learns to avoid the contact of fire and knocking against
hard bodies, as these are painful ; it learns to connect the notion
of the taste of an apple with its appearance, and so on. But soon
it leaves all animals far behind it in the abundance and the refine-
ment of its experiences. It is very instructive to observe the forma-
tion of associations in young animals, as C. Lloyd Morgan^ has sys-
tematically done with young chickens and ducks hatched in an incu-
bator. The chickens are provided with suitable reflex movements only
a few hours after hatching. They run about, peck at whatever at-
tracts their attention and never miss it. Even little partridges may
be seen running about while still partly covered with shell. At first
the young chickens pecked at everything, at the letters of a printed
page, at their own toes, at their own excrements ; but in the last
case the chicken immediately threw away the ill-tasting thing, shook
its head and cleaned its beak by scraping it on the ground. The
young bird behaved in a similar way when it took hold of a bee or
a caterpillar that had a bad taste, but the pecking at unsuitable and
useless objects soon stopped. The chickens left a saucer of water
unnoticed, but they drank immediately when in running about their
* Experience has taught us to know stabilities, our psychical organization
easily adapts itself to them, and gives us advantages. We introduce the sup-
position of further stabilities consciously and at will, in the expectation of
further advantages, supposing this expectation to hpld good. The supposition
of an a priori conception for the founding of this methodical procedure is
neither necessary to us nor would it be of any use to us. It would be pre-
posterous in view of the evidently empirical formation of this conception.
• Comparative Psychology, London, 1894, pp. 85 flF.
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feet happened to get into the water.* Young ducks, on the con-
trary, plunged at once into the saucer of water, washed themselves
in it, dipped under the water, and so on. When on the next day
this saucer was offered to them empty, they again plunged into it
and carried out the same movements as in the water, but they soon
learned to distinguish between the empty saucer and the full one.
I myself once put a drinking-glass over a chicken which had been
hatched out several hours and put a fly into the glass with it. Im-
mediately a very amusing but fruitless chase began, for the chicken,
was not clever enough to catch the fly.
The habits of chickens and ducks are inborn in the young, who
practise them at once without being taught. They are prepared for
by the mechanism of movement, just as are the sounds the fowls
make. We can distinguish in chickens the sound of contentment
when they creep into a warm hand ; the cry of danger at the sight
of, say, a big black beetle ; the cry of loneliness, and so on. But
however much is mechanically prepared and innate in these crea-
tures, and however much the accomplishment of certain associa-
tions may be anatomically favored and made easy, tJie associations
themselves are not innate hut must he acquired by individual ex-
perience.
This will be correct if we apply the word "association" only
to (conscious) notions. If we take it in the wider sense of a reac-
tion of simultaneous organic processes upon one another, then it is
very difficult to draw the line between what is innate (inherited)
and what is individually acquired. And this must be the case if the
acquirements of the species are to be increased or modified by the
individual, 'bly tame sparrow knows no fear, perches on the shoul-
ders of the members of my -family, tugs at hair and beard, defends
itself boldly and with angry chattering against the hand which tries
to drive it from the shoulder of a privileged person ; and yet its
wings quiver nervously at every noise and at every movement near
it. When it takes little bits from the dining-table, it flies off" with
each one, even though only a foot away, just like its companions
in the street, although it is not disturbed by any acquaintances.
Young chickens which have been brought up in an incubator
do not notice the clucking of the hen, neither do they fear a cat or
a hawk. If young kittens before their eyes are opened should ac-
tually spit when taken up by a hand that has stroked a dog, then
* But birds deprived of the cerebrum behave in the same way. The phe-
nomenon thus rests on reflex acquired from ancestors. [Cf. the end of this
chapter. Cf. also Mach, Contributions to the Analysis of the Sensations,
Chicago, 1897, p. 377.—Tr.]
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\vc must suppose tliis to be a reflex of the sense of smell.'' Youni^:
animals to be sure are easily frip^htened ])\ unusual appearances.
Thus, youns^ chickens which were fed on small worms would occa-
sionally swallow also twisted bits of wool, but stood in doubt before
a large piece. A tame youny; sparrow for a long time distrusted its
food-dish. when, by way of exi)erimont, a big meal-worm had been
put in it.** The fear of what is unusual or striking in the case of many
animals appears to be one of the most important means of protection.
In the more highly develoi)ed animals we can perceive the for-
mation of associations still more strikingly, and at the same time
substantiate their durability. In the village in which I passed part
of my youth, many dogs, teased by the children of the village, had
fallen into the habit of running away on three legs and whining
as soon as any one took up a stone from the ground. ( )ne was
naturally inclined, from a human point of view, to take this for a
cunning trick to excite sympathy, but evidently it was only a lively
associated remembrance of the pain which had sometimes followed
the picking up of a stone. I once saw a young hound which belonged
to my father impetuously root out an ant heap, but immediately
clean his sensitive nose with his paw in a puzzled manner. From
then onwards he carefully respected ants' nests. When once this
hound persistently disturbed me in my work by his undesired and
exaggerated attachment, I closed a book with a loud bang in front
of his nose. He drew back frightened. Thereafter the seizing of
a book was enough to keep him from disturbing one. Judging
from the play of his muscles in sleep, this dog must also have had
a vivid imagination in dreams. Once when he lay sleeping quietly.
I brought a little piece of meat near his nose. After some time a
lively play of muscles began, especially of the nostrils. After about
half a minute the dog woke up. snapped up the bit of meat, and then
quietly went to sleep again. I was also able to convince myself of
the durability of this same dog's associations. When I came back
unexpectedly in the dark and on foot to my father's house after nine
years absence, the dog received me with furious barking; but a
single call was enough to turn this at once into the most friendly
behavior. Hence I consider the Homeric story of Odysseus's dog
to be no poetical exaggeration."
' Schneider, Der tierische IViUc. Leipsic. 1880.
' Observed by my daughter.
' Next to the writings of Morgan, K. Mobius. Die Bewegungcn dcr Tiere
uiid ihr psychischer Horizont (Scbrift>^n des naturwissensch. Vereins fiir
Schleswig-Holstein. 1873) on the psychology of lower and higher animals is
very instructive. Further cf. A. Oelzeit-Newin, Kleinere philos. Schrifteti; Zur
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The importance for psychical development of the comparison of
a sense-experience A B C D .... with a sense-experience A K L M
. . . .reproduced in thought cannot be estimated highly enough. The
separate letters may signify whole complexes of elements. A may
be, for example, a body which we have once come across in the
surroundings BCD ... but now meet in the surroundings K L M
. .
.—say a body which moves across its back-ground—and by this
means is recognized as a special image of relative independence.
If now we give the signification of single elements (sensation) to
single letters, we learn to know these elements as independent com-
ponent parts of our experience ; for example, not only an orange
is suggested to us by the red-yellow A, but also a piece of cloth,
a flower, or a mineral ; thus it enters into different complexes. How-
ever, not only analysis but also combination depends on association.
For example let A denote the visual image of an orange or of a
rose, while K in the reproduced complex denotes respectively the
taste of the orange or the smell of the rose. Immediately we asso-
ciate the already tested properties with the newly apparent visual
image. The notions we receive from the things that surround us
do not therefore correspond exactly to the actual sensations, but
are as a rule much richer. There are whole bundles of associated
ideas which, arising from previous experience and becom''ing com-
plicated with the actual sensations, determine our behavior to a far
greater extent than could the sensations alone. We not only see
a red-yellow ball, but think we perceive a soft, fragrant and refresh-
ingly acid bodily thing. We do not see a brown vertical shining
surface, but, say, the wardrobe. But for this reason we can some-
times be misled by a yellow ball of wood, a painting, or a reflection
in a mirror. As we grow older, the variety and richness of our
sense-experience increases as well as the number and variety of the
associative connections between the experiences. As we have seen,
we thus come both to a progressive resolution of these experiences
into parts and also to a continual formation of new syntheses from
them. After the intellectual life becomes matured, thought-com-
plexes can behave with respect to one another in the same productive
and associative manner as sense-experiences. In the thought-com-
plexes new analyses and syntheses will also occur, as every romance
and every scientific work teaches and as every thinker can observe
in himself.
Psychologie der Seesterne, Vienna, 1903. Of earlier writings I may recom-
mend: H. S. Reimarus, Triebe der Tiere, 1790; J. H. F. Autenrieth, Ansichten
iiber Natur- und Scclenleben, 1836.
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Although, now, only one principle of reproduction and associa-
tion can be found, namely that of simultaneity, yet the thought-
process assumes very different characters in different cases. This
will be made clear by the following considerations. Most ideas
have associated with many others in the course of their existence,
and these associations, branching off in various directions, are to
some extent in opposition and weaken one another. If, now, some
of those which converge to the same point do not maintain the pre-
ponderance or are not specially favored by chance, then these asso-
ciations will not be effective. For instance, can any one say when
and where he has used or seen used or learned to know a definite
letter, a word, a concept, or a way of counting? The more fre-
quently he uses these devices and the more familiar he is with them,
the less will he be able to do so. The name "Smith," even in this
definite orthography, is so variously connected with different trades
and occui)ations that by itself it gives rise to no association at all.
According to my momentary direction of thought or occupation it
may remind me of a philosopher, zoologist, historian, archeologist,
mechanician, and so on. We can also observe this in rarer names.
I often went past an advertisement of Maggi's meat-extract and
only once, and then when I was thinking of physics, did it remind
me of a man of the same name who wrote a book on mechanics
which is interesting to me.^ Thus, too, the blue color of a piece of
cloth will suggest nothing of itself to a grown-up person, whereas
it may remind a child of the cornflower which he picked yesterday.
In connection with the name "Paris," there may occur to me the
collections of the Louvre, or the city's renowned physicists and
mathematicians, or its fine restaurants, according as I am inclined
to the pleasures of art, scientific occupation, or culinary delights.
Circumstances which stand in no material relation to the direction of
thought entered upon may also be decisive. In this way Grillparzer
is reported to have remembered a poetical sketch which he had quite
forgotten owing to a long illness, when he again played the sym-
phony which he had played when engaged upon that sketch. Jeru-
salem shows from a case" reported by him that associations can be
induced through unconscious intermediate terms. The principle of
simultaneity is expressed in these cases very clearly and distinctly.^"
* [G. A. Maggi, Teoria delle movimento dei corpi, Milan, 1895.—Tr.]
" Wundt's Philosophische Studicn, Vol. X, p. 323.
"That not all psychical events can be explained by temporarily acquired
(conscious) associations, will be discussed later. Here we are concerned with
what is made comprehensible by association.
*»^
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Let US now consider some types of the thought-process.^^ If I,
without any plan or purpose, and shut off as far as possible from
outer disturbances—say in a sleepless night
—
quite give myself
up to my thoughts, then it happens that they ramble over all sorts of
subjects. Comic and tragic situations that I have remembered or di-
vised mingle with scientific incidents and plans of work, and it would
be very difficult to point out the petty chances which in each moment
have given direction to this "free imagination." Not very differently
do ideas arise when two or more persons are talking without con-
straint to one another, except that here the thoughts of several
persons influence each other. The surprising leaps and turns of con-
versation often give rise to the wondering question: Well, how did
that idea come up? The fixing of thoughts by spoken words and
the number of observers makes the answer easier in this case, and
only seldom does it fail. In dreams ideas pursue the most wonder-
ful paths, but in this case the thread of association is very difficult
to follow, partly on account of the incomplete remembrance which
the dream leaves behind it, partly also on account of more frequent
disturbance because of the great sensitiveness of the sleeper. Situa-
tions that have been experienced, forms that have been seen, and
melodies that have been heard in a dream are often very valuable
for artistic creation ;^- but the scientific investigator can make use of
dream-thoughts only in the rarest cases.
Lucian's priceless Miinchhausen-like tales do not quite cor-
respond to the type of free imagination. This most talented writer
of the ancient world here maintains on principle only the most ad-
venturous and unlikely of his incidents. He speaks of huge spiders
which connect the space between the moon and the morning-star
with a web that can be used as a pathway and jokingly assigns
liquid air as a drink to dwellers in the moon, 1700 years before it
was really known. It is a plan of travel on which, as a guiding
thread, he strings his imaginations. This journey brings him to the
island of dreams, whose indefinite and inconsistent nature he char-
acterizes wonderfully by saying that the nearer the traveler ap-
proaches to it the farther it recedes. In spite of this richly luxuriant
imagination, the threads of association can be found wherever they
are not purposely hidden. The journey begins at the Pillars of
"James, The Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 550-604.
"Well-known cases of this kind are the following: Voltaire dreamed a
complete and varied canto of the Henriade. Still more remarkable is it that
in a dream of Tartini's the devil played the theme of a sonata which the
artist had not composed in waking moments;—if poetry and truth have not
made a compromise in this story.
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Hercules and goes westward. After eighty days the traveler reaches
an island containing a memorial column and an inscription to Her-
cules and Dionysus, as well as the huge footprints of both gods.
Of course there is a river on the island which contains unnc, and
fish the eating of which makes people intoxicated. The sources of
this river spring from the roots of a luxuriously growing vine on
whose branches are women who, like Daphne, have been partly
changed into vines. Here the thread of association has swollen
to a strong rope. At other places the author has even cut away
shoots and flowers of his imagination which did not suit his esthetic
and satirical purpose. By this rejection of what is useless, the in-
tellectual life expressed in a literary or other equally free work of
art differs from aimlessly giving oneself up to his own thoughts.
If I come to a place and into surroundings in which I spent a
part of my youth, and if I simply give myself up to the impressions
that these surroundings make on me, then another type of though-
process results. What is there offered to my senses is in so many
ways associated with the experiences of my youth and is connected
so weakly or not at all with later incidents, that little by little all
the events of that period of my life emerge from forgetfulness with
complete fidelity and in firm connection with one another in con-
secutive arrangement of time and space. In such a case, as Jerusa-
lem" pertinently remarks, one always discovers himself to be a
participant. Hence we can string the elements of remembrance in
a temporal order on the thread of the person. A similar thing
happens, though less completely, when the picture of my home
arises in my mind, provided that the picture is not disturbed and
is given time to complete itself. The tales every one has heard
old people tell of their youth, or their account of summer holidays
and their experiences in them, in which the slightest incident is not
left out, are examples of this type.
The foregoing case was essentially concerned with the mnval
of already existing connections of ideas, that is, with simple recol-
lections ; whereas the solving of a conundrum or other riddle, of a
geometrical or technical problem of construction, or of a scientific
question, or the carrying out of an artistic subject, and so on,
requires a thought-action with a definite end and object.^'* In this
case something nczi.', at the time only partly known, is sought.
This thought-action, which never loses sight of the more or less
circumscribed purpose, we call reflection. If a person who gives
"Jerusalem, Lehrbuch der Psychologic, 3d ed., Vienna, 1902, p. 91.
" [Cf. Popular Scientific Lectures, Chicago, 3d. ed., 1898, p. 277.—T.]
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me a riddle or puts a problem to me is s.tanding before me, or if
I am sitting at my desk on which I already see the traces of my
materials for work, in this way a complex of sensations is provided
which always brings back my thoughts to the end in view and pre-
vents their aimless wandering. This limitation of thought from
the outside is not to be underestimated even for its own sake. If
with a scientific problem in my mind. I finally go to sleep tired out.
then immediately the external reminder and indicator to the goal
is lacking and my thoughts become diffused and leave the proper
path. This is one reason why the solution of scientific problems is
seldom helped in dreams. But if the involuntary interest in the
solution of a problem is strong enough, then the reminders from out-
side are quite superfluous. Everything that one thinks and notices
then leads back of itself to the problem, at times even in a dream.
The idea sought in reflection has to fulfil certain conditions.
It has to solve a riddle or a problem or to make a construction
possible. The conditions are known but not the idea. In order to
explain the kind of thought-movement which leads to finding what
is looked for, we will choose a simple geometrical construction. The
form of procedure is the same in all the
cases coming under consideration here, and
one example is enough to make all cases
comprehensible. Two mutually perpendic-
ular straight lines a and b (Fig. 1) are cut
by any oblique third line c. In the triangle
thus arising, a square is to be inserted
whose angular points are placed on a^ b,
the point of intersection of a and b, and
on c. We now try to represent to ourselves
and construct squares which fulfil all these
conditions. Three angles are enough to
satisfy the conditions if we let one angle of
any square coincide with the point of inter-
section of a and b and two sides of the square with a and b. But the
fourth angle does not fall directly on c, but inside or outside the
triangle. If, on the other hand, we take one angular point any-
where on c, the rectangle thus formed is not generally a square.
But we see that from a rectangle with greater vertical sides we can
pass over to a rectangle with greater horizontal sides by the choice
of the angular point on c, so there must be an intermediate one with
equal sides. Thus we can select the square with any approximation
we wish, from among the series of inscribed rectangles. But there
\
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is still another way. If we start from a square whose fourth angu-
lar point falls inside the triangle and increase it till this angle falls
outside, it must in this way pass through c. Thus a square of the
correct magnitude can be selected with any desired approximation
among the series of squares. Such tentative soundings of the realm
of ideas where we must seek for the solution of the problem, nat-
urally precede the complete solution. Ordinary thought may con-
tent itself with an approximate solution which is sufficient for
practical needs. Science demands the most general, the shortest
and the most lucid solution. We obtain this by recollecting (start-
ing from the consideration either of the rectangles or of the squares)
that all inscribed squares have as common diagonals the angle
bisector proceeding from the point of intersection of a and b. Thus,
if we draw this angle bisector from this knozmi point, we can com-
plete the desired square simply by finding the point of intersection
of this bisector with c. Though this example is very simple—it is
intentionally chosen as such and very fully discussed—it makes
us clearly conscious of the essential part of the solution of every
problem, namely, experimentation ztntJi thoughts and zmth recollec-
tions, as well as its identity with the familiar solution of riddles.
The riddle is solved by means of a notion which shows properties
corresponding to the conditions ABC.... Association affords
us a series of notions of the property A, of the property B, and so
on. The term or terms which belong to all these series—in which
all these series meet—solves the problem. We will return at still
greater length to this important subject. Here it is only our inten-
tion to explain that type of thought-process called reflections^
What has preceded puts beyond doubt the importance of re-
producible and associable traces of recollection of sense-experiences
for our whole psychical life, and shows at the same time that
psychological and physiological researches cannot be separated from
one another, since even in the elements of the experiences relations
of both kinds are most closely connected.
Reproducibility and associability also form the basis of "con-
sciousness." The unintermittent subsistence of an invariable per-
" We may be tempted to consider that "active" reflection is essentially
different from the "passive" leaving of our thoughts to take their own course.
But, just as we are not masters over the sensations and recollections which are
liberated by some act of our bodies, so we have no power over a thought of
direct or indirect biological interest which is always reappearing and to
which new series of associations are always being joined. Cf. my Populdr-
wissensch. Vorlesungen, 3d ed., pp. 287-308 [Popular Scientific Lectures, 3d
ed., Chicago, 1898, pp. 259-281].
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ception will hardly be said by anybody to be consciousness. Hobbes"
says, "Always to perceive the same object and not to perceive at all
come to the same thing." Nor is it evident what is to be attained
by the assumption of a special "energy of consciousness" different
from all other physical energies. That would be an assumption
which would have no function at all—would be unnecessary—in
the province of physics, and in the province of psychology would
make nothing clearer. Consciousness is no special (psychical) qual-
ity or class of qualities, which differs from physical qualities; nor
is it a special qualitiy which must be added to the physical ones
in order to make conscious what is unconscious. Introspection as
well as observation of other living beings to which we must ascribe
consciousness analogous to our own, shows us that consciousness
has its roots in reproduction and association, and that the height of
consciousness runs parallel to the richness, fluency, rapidity, vitality,
and arrangement of these functions. Consciousness does not con-
sist in a special quality, but in a special connection of given qualities.
We must not wish to explain sensation. It is something so simple
and fundamental that its reduction to something still more simple
cannot be successful, at least not at present. A single sensation is
neither conscious nor unconscious. It becomes conscious by classi-
fying it with the experience of the present time.^®
Every disturbance of reproduction and association is a disturb-
ance of consciousness, and can manifest all degrees from complete
clearness to entire loss of consciousness in dreamless sleep or in a
fainting fit. Temporary or lasting disturbance of the connection of
the cerebral functions is also a temporary or lasting disturbance of
consciousness. Comparative anatomical, physiological and psycho-
pathological facts necessitate the supposition that the integrity of
consciousness is conditioned by that of the cerebral lobes. Different
parts of the cerebral cortex show traces of different sense-excitations,
definite parts show those of the optical sensations, others of the
acoustical, others of the tactile, and so on. These different cortical
areas are connected with one another in numerous ways by means
of the fibers of association. Psychical disturbances follow every
cesssation of the function of an area of the cortex and every inter-
" Sentire semper idem et non sintire ad idem recidunt; Physica, IV, 25.
" Whoever thinks that he can build up the world from consciousness has
not made it clear to himself what sort of a complication the fact of conscious-
ness includes. A very condensed and valuable discussion of the nature and
conditions of consciousness is to be found in Wernicke's Gesammelte Aufs'dtse,
Berlin, 1893 (on consciousness, see pp. 130-145). Cf. also the lectures of
Me3mert cited in the following note.
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rupted CDiinection.^" Without s^oinj^ into many details, we will illus-
trate this by typical examples.
The notion of an orange is an extremely complicated thing.
l*"orni. color, taste, smell, touch, and so on are interwoven in a
peculiar way. If 1 hear the ikiiiic "'orange" this train of acoustic
sensations drags forward the whole bundle of the above notions
as if by a thread. In addition to this there follows, as a consequence
of the name which has been heard, the remembrance of the sensations
experienced at the sound of the name, and also the remembrance
of the sensations of the motions of writing the word and the visual
form of the written or ])rinted word. Accordingly, if there are in
the brain special optical, acoustical, and tactile areas, and if one of
these is eliminated by the suppression of its function or the removal
of its association with the remaining areas, peculiar phenomena
appear. Such have actually been observed. If the optical or the
acoustical area continues to function while its associative connec-
tions with other, important fields cease to function, then "mental
blindness" (Seeleiiblindheit) or "mental deafness," which Munk
has observed in dogs by operations on the cerebrum, respectively
arise.-" .Such dogs see but do not luiderstand what they see ; they
do not recognize their food-dish, the whip, or a threatening gesture.
In the case of mental deafness the dog hears but pays no attention
to the well-known call-—it does not understand it. The observations
of physiologists are here supplemented and confirmed by those of
])s\chopathologists. The study of disturbances of speech-' is espe-
cially productive here. The meaning of a word lies indeed in the
crowd of associations which the word calls up and the correct use
of it rests inversely on the existence of these associations. Dis-
turbances of the latter must express themselves here in a striking
way. Most people are ri_g/z /-handed, and thus use the left hemi-
sphere of the cerebrum for finer work and also for speech. Broca
recognized the importance of the hinder part of the third left brain-
convolution for articulate speech. Speech is always lost when this
part of the brain becomes ill (apoplexy). Loss of speech (ai)hasia)
" Meynert, Populdre Vortrdgc, Vienna, 1892, pp. 2-40.
""
It can hardly be doubted that there is a difference in the work performed
by different parts of the brain. But if, as Goltz has shown, a part of the
cerebral cortex can by degrees replace the others, an abrupt delimination of
functions is not to be thought of, but only a "gradual localization" in the sense
of R. Semon {Die Mncme, Leipsic, 1904, p. 160). Cf. also Analyse der Em-
pUndungen, 1886, p. 82, 4th and 5th ed., p. 165. [Contributions to the Analysis
of the Sensations, Chicago, 1897, pp. 112, 115, 116. The full title of R. Semon's
book is : Die Mnenic als erhaltendes Prinzip im Wechsel dcs organischen Ge-
schehens, and a third edition was published in 191 1.—Tr.]
^ Kussmaul, Storungen der Sprachc, Leipsic, 1885.
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can also be conditioned by very many different defects. For example,
the patient remembers words as sound-images and can also make
them known by means of writing, yet cannot speak the words in
spite of the mobility of the tongue, lips and so on ; the motor word-
image is lacking and does not liberate the suitable movement. The
optical or motor writing-image may also be lacking (agraphia).
The ideas may be present while the auditory word-image is lack-
ing. It may also happen the other way round that the spoken or
written word is not understood
—
gives' rise to no associations—and
then we have ivord-dcafness or word-blindiiess. Such a case of
word-deafness and word-blindness with an intelligence otherwise
unimpaired Lordat himself experienced and after his cure was able
to give an account of it. He movingly describes the moment when,
after many sad weeks, he noticed on the back of a book in his library
the words Hippocratis opera, and could again read and understand
them.'-- Even after this summary and by no means complete and de-
tailed account of the cases here presented, we can estimate how many
paths of connection between the sensory and motor areas come into
consideration.-^ Lesser disturbances of speech, as expressed by
mistakes in writing and speaking, appear as consequences of tempo-
rary weariness and preoccu])ation among quite healthy people. Thus
someone cited the two chemists Liebig and Mitscherlich as "Mit-
schich and Liederlich." Another called a Magister dcr Pharuiacie
a Philistcr der Magie,-*
An interesting case of mental blindness is reported by Wil-
brancl.-^' A very cultured and well-read merchant enjoyed an extra-
ordinary visual memory. The features of the people whom he re-
membered, the forms and colors of objects of which he thought,
and theatrical scenes and landscapes he had seen, appeared before
him in complete clearness with every detail. He could read from
memory parts of letters and several pages from his favorite authors,
for he saw the text before him with all its details. His memory for
auditory impressions was small and his sense of music was lacking.
"" Kussmaul, op. cit., p. 175.
^ Kussmaul, op. cit., p. 182.
^ On curious disturbances among musicians, analogous to aphasia and
agrapliia, cf. R. Wallaschek (Psychologic und Pathologie der Vorstellung,
Leipsic, 1905).
[In the text, we have had to leave the German words to tell their own
tale, as the point would obviously be lost in an English translation. EngHsh
equivalents are the probably mythical utterances, called "Spoonerisms," of a
certain Oxford professor. Thus, instead of: "We are all standing on the same
dead level," the professor is reported to have said : "We are all standing on
the same lead devil."—Tr.]
'^' Wilbrand, Scclcnbliiidlicit, Wiesbaden, 1887, pp. 43-51.
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Heavy cares, which proved to be unfounded, were followed by a
time of confusion, and this again by a complete change in his psy-
chical life. His visual memory was completely lost. A town to
which he often returned appeared new to him every time. The fea-
tures of his wife and children were strange to him, and he even
looked upon himself as a strange person when he saw his reflection
in a looking-glass. If he now wished to reckon—an operation which
he formerly performed by visual images—he had to pronounce the
numbers, and he was likewise obliged to have recourse to auditory
images and images of motions of speech and writing in order to note
phrases or to remember what was written. No less remarkable is
another case of loss of visual memory .^° A lady had a sudden and
violent fall. Afterwards she was supposed to be blind since she did
not recognize any one around her. But the fall, besides restricting
her field of vision which gradually improved, left only the loss of
visual memory of which the patient was fully conscious. She made
the characteristic comment: "To judge from my condition, we see
more with our brains than with our eyes ; the eyes are merely the
means for seeing; for I see everything clearly, but I do not recog-
nize it and often do not know what I see.^^
In the light of the above cases, we must say tha! there is not
one memory but that memory is made up of several partial memories
which are separated from one another and can be separately lost.
To these partial memories correspond different parts of the brain,
some of which can even now be localized with a fair degree of ac-
curacy. Other cases of the loss of memory seem more difficult to
reduce to a principle. We will only consider some of them which
Ribot^* has collected.
A young woman, who passionately loved her husband, fell in
childbed into a prolonged unconsciousness and as a consequence of
this her memory of the time of her marriage entirely vanished
while her memory of her earlier life up to her marriage remained
quite unimpaired. Only the witness of her parents led to the
acknowledgment of her husband and child. The loss of memory
in her case remained irreparable. Again, a woman fell into a torpor
which lasted for two months. After she woke up she knew nobody
round her and had forgotten everything she had learned. Easily
and in a short time she learned everything again, but without any
°* Wilbrand, op. cit., p. 54.
''Wilbrand, op. cit, p. 57.
'^Les maladies de la memoire, Paris, 1888. English edition, Chicago, The
Open Court Publishing Co., 1898.
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remembrance that she had known it before. Yet again, a woman
fell by chance into some water and was nearly drowned ; when she
opened her eyes she did not recognize her surroundings and had
lost her speech, hearing, smell, and taste. She had to be fed. She
daily began to learn anew and her condition gradually improved.
She remembered a love-affair and her fall into the water and was
cured by jealousy.
Periodic losses of memory are the most remarkable. After a
long sleep, a woman had forgotten everything she had learned. She
had to learn again how to read, reckon, and become acquainted with
her surroundings. After some months she had another deep sleep.
When she awoke, she found herself in possession of memories of
her youth just as before her first sleep, but had forgotten what had
occurred between the two periods of sleep. From then onwards for
four years the two states of consciousness and memory were re-
peated periodically. In the first state she had beautiful handwriting
;
in the second, a poor one. People whom she was supposed to know
permanently had to be introduced to her in both states. This case
is illustrated by one often quoted of a servant who lost a parcel
when he was drunk and could only find it again when he was in a
second drunken fit. In a waking state one remembers even one's
vivid dreams with difficulty, and inversely in dreams the conditions
of a waking state mostly quite vanish from us. On the other hand
the same situations often enough repeat themselves in a dream.-^
Finally every one can notice for himself, even when he is awake,
the changes of moods with which the experiences of different pe-
riods of his life come into consciousness in quite different degrees
of vividness. All these cases form a continuous passage from the
sharp separation of different states of consciousness to almost com-
plete effacement of the boundary. These cases can be considered
as examples of the formation of different centers of association
round which the masses of ideas group themselves when favored
by time and mood, while these masses show no degree of connection,
or only a small one, with one another.^*'
If, with Hering,^^ w& attribute to the organism the property of
^ [A friend of mine dreamed that he was buying things in a shop. In
the dream he suddenly became conscious of the fact that he had forgotten
what to buy next and could only remember if he woke up. So he woke up,
remembered, and then went to sleep and continued the same dream.—Tr.]
'"With reference to such periodical disturbances of memory, observations
like those of Swoboda (Die Perioden des menschlichen Organismus, 1904) do
not appear so adventurous as they do at first sight.
" [On Memory and the Specific Energies of the Nervous System, Chicago,
1895]
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adapting itself better successively as events are repeated, then we
recognize what we commonly call memory to be a partial phenom-
enon of a general organic phenomenon. It is the adaptation to
periodic events in so far as it directly comes into consciousness.
Heredity, instinct, etc., may then be characterized as memory stretch-
ing out bcvond the individual. In R. Semon's book Mncme, above
cited, appears the first endeavor to investigate and to clarify scien-
tificallv the relation between heredity and meniory.^-
'*Detto ("Ueber den Begriff des Gedachtnisses in seiner Bedeutung fiir
die Biologie," Natiinviss. Wochenschr., 1905, No. 42V The author will hardly
admit that Ilering or Semon fall into the faults denounced by him. The ad-
vantages of the investigation of what is organic from tzvo sides he appears to
me to underestimate. Psychological observation can reveal to us the existence
of physical events the knowledge of which we could not attain so soon by a
physical way.
